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CFA countries fared worse than other comparable countries in
the 1980s and reduced  spending  - particularly  investments-
disproportionately in adjusting to  the external environment.
This is an ominous sign for future growth.
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For most of the 13 African members of the CFA  Performance indicators for members of the
Franc Zone, the 1980s have been a decade of  CFA Zone deteriorated more than indicators for
slow or negative growth in per capita GDP,  other groups, especially in the second half of the
worsening balance of payments, debt crises,  decade.
financial crises, declining competitiveness,  and
an apparent failure to adjust to the changed  Growth and investment rates, in particular,
environment they inherited from the 1970s.  fell more for CFA countries. This decline is
attributed to the CFA members' declining
Devarajan and de Melo reassess the costs  competitiveness as other countries undertook
and benefits of membership in the CFA Franc  adjustment programs that emphasized deprecia-
Zone in light of its members' poor performance  tion of the real exchange rate.
in the 1980s.
Controlling for changes in the extemal
They base their assessment on comparisons  environment, Devarajan and de Melo show that
of the members' performance indicators with  CFA countries adjusted less than comparator
indicators for comparator groups:  other coun-  countries during she 1980s.
tries in Sub-Saharan Africa, other low- and
middle-income countries, and other exporters of  And the burden of their adjustment appears
fuel and primary goods.  to have faUlen  disproportionately on reduced
spending, particularly reduced investment - an
ominous sign for future growth.
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I. Introduction
For most of the thirteen African members of  the CFA Franc
Zone, the 1980's have been a  decade of slow or negative growth in
per  capita  GDP,  worsening  balance  of  payments,  debt  crises,
financial  crises,  declining competitiveness  and  --  most distressing
of all --  an apparent lack of adjustment to the changed external
environment they inherited from the 1970's.  Of the few recently-
documented  "success stories" of adjustment in Africa, none is a
member of the CFA Zone (World  Bank (1989]).
This disappointing performance  is curious in light of  the
cautious  optimism  about  Zone membership  voiced  earlier  in  the
decade by, among others, Guillaumont and Guillaumont (1984], and
Devarajan and de Melo  (1987a].  Their optimism stemmed from the
notion that participation in the Franc Zone  would foster growth on
the one hand, and reduce the need  for adjustment on the other.
Guaranteed convertibility of the CFA Franc and the fixed exchange
rate with  the  French  Franc would  lead to  a  stable  investment
climate  for domestic and foreign investors, thereby stimulating
economic growth.  As for adjustment, the rules of the Zone led to
monetary and fiscal discipline.  By avoiding some of the excesses
of their African neighbors, Zone members' need to adjust would be
less  --  even  though  they  lacked  an  important  instrument  of
adjustment,  namely,  a  currency  devaluation.  Furthermore,  as
Devarajan and de  Melo [1987b]  pointed out, CFA countries had enough
1For a  recent analysis of the  failure of  the CFA Zone to
realize the gains from monetary cooperation, see Honohan 11990].2
instruments  with which to depreciate the real exchange rate which
was, after all, the relevant signal for structural adjustment.
The purpose of this paper  is to reassess the benefits and
costs of the CFA  Zone in light of the poor performance of  its
members in the 1980's.  We do so by looking at the facts.  First,
in section II, we ask  whether on average CPA countries fared worse
than a  group of "comparator"  countries.  Since there is no clear-
cut group of comparators, we look at three:  other Sub-Saharan
African countries, other low- and  middle-income  countries and other
primary and  fuel  exporters.  Recognizing that  a  comparison  of
averages  neglects differences  within  a  group  of  countries,  we
perform  some  statistical estimations  in  section III.  We  ask:
assuming that year-to-year GDP growth rates for all countries are
drawn  from  a  random  distribution,  is  there  evidence  that  the
distribution  of  CFA  countries'  growth  rates  is  significantly
different from that of the comparators?  In section IV, we take a
closer look at the adjustment experience of CFA countries vis-a-
vis their comparators.  Did CFA countries adjust less, controlling
for the size of the external shock, than other countries?  Did
they adjust differently?  One argument is that, given that they
cannot devalue their nominal exchange rate, CFA countries cannot
levy  an  "inflation tax"  to  finance a  fiscal deficit.  We  ask
whether this  led to  lower inflation and higher current account
deficits.  Another argument is that the fixed exchange rate makes
expenditure-switching more difficult, so that CFA countries rely3
more on expenditure-reduction as a means of adjustment.  We test
this hypothesis.  Section V contains some concluding remarks.
II. Growth and Adiustment in the CFA Zone: An Overview
In this section, we compare the average performance of CFA
members with  that of the three groups of comparator countries.
Rather  than  undertake  a  detailed  analysis, we  look  for broad
patterns  that  will  suggest  the  statistical  evaluations  of
subsequent sections.  This approach is based on simple, unweighted
averages  of  countries'  performance  indicators  over  different
periods.  The approach does nrt recognize that during the last two
decades, countries have beean  subjected to external and internal
shocks that have varied in timing and magnitude across countries.
Our method of aggregation by country groupings implies that the
shocks were uniform within each group.  Later, we will allow for
some diversity in comparisons based on an error components model.
Nevertheless, these preliminary comparisons are a useful starting
point for further analysis.
We compare CFA members with three groups  of comparators.  The
most  important  comparator  group  is  other  Sub-Saharan  African
countries  (SSA).  These countries have most in common with  Zone
members  in  terms  of  economic  structure,  history  and  culture.
Furthermore,  being their neighbors, they provide Zone members with
the best perspective on  "life outside the CFA  Zone".  We  also
compare CFA countries with other low-income countries and other
primary exporters.  Except for Gabon, all CFA countries had a per4
capita income in 1980 bel^w $1200.  We use this figure  as the cut-
off for low-income countries.  Higher income countries, such as
those in Latin America and East Asia, tend to have very different
economic  structures  and  human  capital  endowments;  hence  their
exclusion from the comparator set.  In the same  vein, there is some
evidence that countries producing and exporting primary products
have  different  adjustment historiee  from those which  emphasize
manufactured goods tFaini  and de Melo (forthcoming)].  Since every
CFA country is either a primary or fuel exporter, we also compare
them with other primary/fuel exporters 2.
Table 1  displays the averages for our different indicators of
CFA countries and their compaxators  during the period 1973-88.  We
divide the period into two subperiods, corresponding (roughly)  to
the  pre-  and post-adjustment periods  for most  countries.  The
results broadly confirm our earlier results (Devarajan  and de Melo
[1987a]), where  the sample  period extended  from  1960 to  1982.
There, we showed that CFA countries' average GDP growth rate was
slightly higher than that of other Sub-Saharan African countries,
but lower than that of other developing countries 3. Furthermore,
we found that the relative performance of CFA countries improved
after 1973.  We attributed the differences to the benefits from
2The definition of a  manufacturing  exporter is a  country whose
share of  manufactured goods in  total exports exceeds 30 percent  and
whose share of manufacturing in GDP exceeds 13 percent.  All other
developing countries are in our comparator group.
3A complementary study by Guillaumont et al. [1988aJ reached
the same conclusion using a broader set of indicators.  See also
Guillaumont et al. [1988bJ.5
TAUJE  1s A  Comparison Between the 1970's and 1980's
Average  Annual  Real  GDP Growth  Rate  (percent)
1973-81  1982-89
CFA  (11)  3.7  2.6
Other:
SSA (20)  2.7  2.0
Low-income (41)  4.4  2.9
Prin.ary  (52)  4.6  3.9
Real Total Investment/Real GDP
CPA  24.3  18.9
Other:
SSA  20.3  17.8
Low-income  21.6  19.8
Primary  22.5  19.4
Debt/GDP (Debt Service/Exports in parenthesis)
CFA  30.6  (7.7)  62.5  (19.2)
Other:
SSA  28.6  (9.7)  70.5  (20.9)
Low-income  26.0 (13.0)  58.4  (22.3)
Primary  24.9 (15.1)  56.4  (25.2)
Average Annual Inflation
CFA  12.0  .3
Other:
SSA  24.3  29.7
Low-income  18.4  33.3
Primary  24.4  44.9
Real Exchange Rate (1980=100)
CFA  107.0  108.0
Other:
SSA  115.0  147.0
Low-income  103.0  121.0
Primary  103.0  119.0
Average Annual Export Growth Rate
CFA  6.8  1.5
Other:
SSA  1.9  2.6
Low-income  4.9  5.0
Primary  4.8  7.6
Note: Unweighted averages.  Number of countries in parenthesis.6
stability  of  a  fixed  exchange  rate  regime, especially  in  the
turbulent post-1973 era of floating exchange rates.
The pattern we discerned using data up to 1982 appears  to have
persisted through the late  1980'..  Table  1 indicates that CFA
countries  enjoyed  an  average  annual  growth  rate  over  half  a
percentage  point  higher  than  their  African  neighbors.  Their
performance  relative  to other  low-income  and  primary-exporting
countries  continued  to  be  inferior.  While  the  basic  trends
established up to 1982 appear to be sustained, the gap between CFA
and other African countries seems to be narrowing.  The difference
in GDP growth rates was a full percentage point in the 1970's.
As for other  indicators in Table  1, the gap in investment-
to-GDP ratios between CFA countries and their African counterparts
narrowed much further during the eighties.  Whereas in the 1970's
Zone  members  had  a  higher  investment  ratio  than  any  of  the
comparators (and four percentage points higher than other African
countries), in the 1980's they were all bunched around the same
number.  The decline in investment, and the narrowing of the gap
between  CFA countries and others, is a two-edged sword.  On the one
hand, lower investment ratios could be associated  with an increase
in the efficiency of investment, as various "white eflephants"  are
aba,adoned. On the other hand, if there is no improvement in the
marginal efficiency of investment, the shortfall would  signal a
further slowdown in GDP growth in the future.  As we will see, the
latter possibility appears more likely when we look at the 1982-
89 period more closely.7
The next two indicators, debt and inflation, highlight the
particular aspects of the CPA Zone rather sharply.  Having a fixed
and rigid nominal exchange rate with the French Franc --  changes
in  parity  require  the  unanimous  conser.  of  Zone  members  --
effectively limits  the seignorage tax that CFA countries can levy.
Consequently, the countries have experienced dramatically lower
inflation rates than their African counterparts, let alone than
other low-income and primary-producing countries.  In fact, while
average inflation  rates have risen in  other parts of the developing
world,  as  a  consequence  of  the  deterioration  in  the  external
environment starting around 1982,  they have fallen in  the CFA Zone:
the average rate in the 1980's  was under 5 percent.
At the same time, CFA countries have had, until recently, an
unlimited line of credit from the French treasury, known as the
compte d'operations.  This anabled them to have an average debt-
to-GDP  ratio  in  the  1970's  that  was  higher  than  all  of  the
comparator  groups' averages.  As  it  has  for other  low-income
countries, this  ratio doubled  for the CFA  Zone  in the  1980's.
However, the debt-to-GDP ratio rose less rapidly than in the SSA
group.  Thus, while the fixed exchange rate may have exerted some
monetary discipline  in the CFA Zone, it did not decrease their
reliance on external finance.
The next two indicators, debt service/exports and the real
exchange rate should be examined jointly, along with the debt-to-
GDP ratio,  since a  real exchange rate depreciation slhould  help
lower the debt-service ratio if there is an export supply response8
--  &lthough it will  also raise the debt-to-GDP ratio  (see,  for
example, Rodrik  (1989]).  While CFA countries' average debt-to-
GDP ratio over 1982-89  was lower than their African counterparts,
their average debt-service ratio was almost the same.  In other
words,  the  debt-servicing  needa  and,  implicitly,  the
creditworthiness  of  these  two  groups  of  countries  are  roughly
comparable.  Yet, while the real exchange rate of the other African
countries depreciated almost  3. percent between the  1970's and
1980's, that of the CFA Zone stayed the same.  This may provide a
clue to the debt-service  puzzle  mentioned earlier.  By depreciating
their real exchange rates, the other African countries have been
able to raise exports so that their ratio of debt-service payments
to  exports is comparable to that of CFA countries, although at the
expense  of  their  debt-to-GDP  ratio.  Put  another way,  by  not
depreciating  their  real  exchange rate,  the CFA  countries  have
probably not generated  a comparable  export supply  response, so that
their debt service ratio is the same as that of other  African
countries, although their debt-to-GDP ratio is lower.
Some of the speculation in the above paragraph is vindicated
by a comparison of export growth of CFA countries vi3-a-vis their
comparators.  Zone members  experience.  faster  growth  in  thair
exports  than all of their comparators  during 1973-81;  in the second
subperiod,  1982-89, their  average  export  growth  rate  was  the
slowest,  perhaps  because  of  the  lack  of  real  exchange  rate
depreciation.9
This comparison between the seventies and eighties masks the
evolution of adjustment throughout the 1980's.  When we break the
period  up  into  two  subperiods,  1982-85  and  1986-89,  the
deterioration in the CFA  Zone's position becomes clearer.  The
results  appear  in Table  2.  Several  striking patterns  emerge.
First,  while the CFA countries' average GDP growth was higher than
that of other African countries in the first subperiod, it was
actually lower in the second.  When the growth rate in the rest of
Africr  accele2ated  after  1985, that  in the CFA  Zone declined.
Second, the investment rate in the Zone fell sharply during this
period, to the point where it is (marginally) lower than that of
all  its  comparators  (recall that  in  the  1973-81  it  was  the
highest).  Third, while the real exchange rate in other African
cQdntries depreciated even more sharply in the second period, it
appreciated  in  the  CFA  Zone,  partially  a  reflection  of  the
depreciation of the dollar vis-a-vis the French franc.
One  interpretation of this change in relative positions is
that, by undertaking adjustment programs that emphasized a real
exchange rate depreciation, the other African countries were able
to  benefit  from the  improvement  in world  commodity  ptices  and
demand after 1985.  In particular, they were able to enjoy export
growth  which  translated  into  faster  GDP  growth.  Another
interpretation would  emphasize  that the competitiveness  of CFA
countries was undermined by the continued depreciation of their10
L,  AU  2:  A  Closer Look at the 19808
Average  Annual  Real GDP Growth  Rate  (percent)
1982-85  1986-89
CFA  (11)  3.5  1.8
Other:
SSA  (20)  1.0  3.0
Low-income  (41)  2.4  3.4
Primary  (52)  4.8  2.9
Real  Total  Investment/Real  GDP
CFA  21.3  16.6
Other:
SSA  18.4  17.1
Low-income  20.7  18.8
Primary  20.6  18.2
Debt/GDP  (DeXt Service/Exports  in parenthesis)
CFA  58.0  (16.1)  67.1  (21.5)
Other:
SSA  57.1  (17.1)  83.5  (24.9)
Low-income  49.3  (19.5)  67.6  (25.0)
Primary  47.1  (22.4)  65.9  (27.9)
Average  Annual  Inflation
CFA  8.6  1.0
Other:
SSA  26.2  35.7
Low-income  19.5  50.4
Primary  28.9  64.6
Real  Exchange  Rate  (1980=100)
CFA  115.0  100.0
Other:
SSA  124.0  177.0
Low-income  109.0  136.0
Primary  106.0  136.0
Average  Annual  Export  Growth  Rate
CFA  3.0  0.1
Other:
SSA  0.1  5.0
Low-income  1.2  8.8
Primary  7.6  7.7
Note:  Unweighted  averages.  Number  of countries  in parenthesis.14
neighbors' currencies 4. There is also some evidence that after
1982,  the line of credit from  the compte  d'operations  was no longer
completely open.  Zone members needed to cut back their current
account deficits.  Given the lack of real exchange depreciation,
this must have come through  expenditure reduction.  In particular,
they reduced investment sharply which led to a fall in GDP growth
rates, which may continue into the future.
III. Are CFA Zone Growth Rates Different?
As  mentioned  earlier,  a  comparison  of  averages  assumes
implicitly that all countries within a group are uniform.  We now
relax that assumption.  Specifically,  we assume  that the GDP growth
rate  for  each  country  in  each  year  is  drawn  from  a  random
distribution.  We then ask whether the distribution from  which CFA
countries' growth rates are drawn is significantly different from
that  of  the  comparators.  Note  that  this,  too,  is  a  strong
assumption  since  it assumes away  the role  of  a  host  of other
factors  which influence growth.
A common method for answering the question asked by the title
to this section is by pooling the cross-section and time-series
4Lest we read too much into the real exchange rate figures,
we should clarify how they are constructed.  The figures represent
the ratio of the trade-weighted average of the wholesale price
indices of each country's trading partners to the consumer price
index of that country.  Hence, they represent only a partial index
of  competitiveness.  In  particular,  a  sudden  increase  in  a
country's export price will not be captured in the real exchange
rate index.  Nevertheless, to the extent that African countries
face similar commodity prices, the index presented here reflects
the differences in competitiveness across groups of countries.12
data and using least squares regression with dummy variables.  To
control for country-specific differences, this method requires a
dummy  variable  for each  country, which  severely restricts  the
number  of degrees  of freedom.  Instead,  we use a  modified approach,
known as the "e.arror-components  framework" which assumes that the
intercept term in the regression of the logarithm of GDP on the
time trend (and a dummy variable) is also a random variable.  This
random variable is assumed to pick up the influence of omitted
variables  in  determining  growth.  The  error-components  method
requires the use of a generalized least squares estimator to get
efficient estimates (see  Fuller and Battese (1974])  but results in
greater degrees of freedom.5 As this was also the model estimated
in  our  previous  work  on  the  CFA  Zone  (Devarajan and  de  Melo
(1987a]), it  also  has  the  advantage  of providing  a  basis  for
comparison.
Table 3 presents the estimated coefficients for P  and P'  in
the following model:
Yit=  aiDit + aiDit  +  pDitT  +  p'DitT  + uit
where
Yit  logarithm of GDP of country i in year t
D.t  =  dummy variable for CFA members
D it  dummy variable for comparator group members
T  =  time trend
uit  composed error term6
5The maintained hypothesis is that the random component is
uncorrelated with the time trend.
6The composed error term uit =  ai +  vit where ai are random
variables rather than fixed and v.  is the usual error term.  We
assume that the residuals from di'fierent  cross-section units are
independent.13
Given the definition of the variables, the estimates of p  and p'
represent  the  growth  reaces  for  CFA  and  comparator  countries,
respectively.
Table 3
Estimated Growth Rates from Error-Components Model
(standard  errors in parenthesis)
1973-81  1982-89
CFA  3.9  2.1
(0.33)  (0.43)
Other:
SSA  2.5  2.3
(0.25)  (0.33)
Low Income  4.2  3.0
(0.19)  (0.23)
Primary  4.5  2.8
(0.17)  (0.20)
Note: All the coefficients are significantly different from zero
at the 95% confidence level.
The regression results confirm the pattern suggested by the
comparisons of averages above.  While they enjoyed significantly
higher growth rates than their African counterparts in  the 1970's,
CFA countries fell behind in the 1980's.  In fact, the estimated
growth rate for CFA countries is lower than that for other Sub-
Saharan African countries for the 1982-89 period as a whole.  Our
comparison of means showed  this to be true only for the latter  half
of this period, i.e., for 1986-89.  Furthermore, the gap between14
CFA countries and other  low income countries and other  primary
exporters appears to have widened.
Table 3  shows that the growth rates of CFA countries and their
comparators were all significantly different from zero, and that
the growth rate of CFA countries fell more in the second subperiod
than did those of the others.  It does not, however, answer the
question,  "was the growth  rate  of  CFA  countries  significantly
different from that of its comparators?"  To answer this, we need
to test whether the difference in  the coefficients is  significantly
different from zero.  Table 4 reports the results of such a test,
where  "significantly different from zero" is defined at the 95
percent confidence level.
Table 4
Growth Comparisons by Subperiod
1973-81  1982-89
Other:
SSA  +  NS-
Low Income  NS-
Primary  NS-
Note: +  (-)  indicates that growth in the CFA Zone  was significantly
higher (lower)  than in  the  comparator group;  NS+(NS-) indicates  the
growth  rate  in  the  CFA  Zone  was  higher  (lower)  but  not
significantly so.
Once again,  the results corroborate the  fact that the CFA
Zone's  performance  has  declined  in  relative  terms  during  the
1980's.  The members' growth rate was significantly higher than
that in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1970's.  In the 1980's, it was15
lower, but not significantly so.  If we think of economic growth
as a running race, CFA countries in the 1970's  were clearly ahead
of the pack of all African countries.  By the 1980's, they were
indistinguishable from the rest of the pack.  Similarly, while CFA
members' growth rate was not significantly different from that of
other  low-income countries  in  1973-81, it became  significantly
lower  in  1982-89. That  is,  in  the race  with  other  low-income
countries, CFA Zone members fell behind the pack in the 1980's.
IV. A Control Group Approach to Adjustment
The statistical approach in the previous section suffers from
the fact t.hat  it does not control for factors that are likely to
affect  performance.  In particular,  developing  countries  were
differentially affected by external shocks during the 1970's and
1980's. Could the differences in growth  rates between the CFA Zone
and its comparators  be attributable  to these left-out factors?  In
this  section, we  attempt a  partial answer  to that question  by
relying on a statistical approach often used in the evaluation of
adjustment programs, namely, the modified control-group approach
(see, for example, Faini et al. (forthcoming)].  In terms of our
evaluation, this method amounts to looking for a fixed effect (in
this case, belonging to the CFA Zone) in explaining performance
after controlling for changes in the external environment facing
each  country.  As  before,  our  comparisons  are  for  the  two
subperiods,  1973-81 and  1982-89.  Adding  some structure to our
model, we now specify that the change in performance between the16
two subperiods --  where performance is measured by  the average
value of selected indicators during each period --  is a function
of autonomous policy changes after controlling for changes in the
external environment  between  the two  periods.  Specifically,  denote
the set of performance  indicators j  for country i by Yij.  We
postulate that changes in the value of each performance indicator
depends on the vector of autonomous policy cnanges, xi, on changes
in the external environment, SHi, and on membership  in the CFA
Zone:
Yij =oj  + Xi'ai +  SHi 2 J + a3jd + eij
where a prime denotes a transpose and d is a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 for countries that belong to the CFA Zone
and 0 otherwise.
Since autonomous policy changes are difficult to observe, we
postulate that they are a function of the difference between the
realized value of a performance indicator and some target value.
Hence,  we  use  lagged  values  of  the  performance  indicators  as
proxies for the changes in policy (see  Faini et al. for details).
The statistical results reported below show the coefficients for
a model where each observation  is an average over  the first or
second subperiods.
The shock variable is a weighted average of changes in the
world real interest rate (R), export price index (PX) and import
price index (PM) for each country.  The weights are the ratios to17
GDP  (Y) of debt  (D), exports  (X) and imports (M), respectively.
By "changes",  we mean the difference in the average value of these
variables between 1973-81 and 1982-89.  In symbols,
SH =  (R2 - R1)(D/Y)l  - (PX2 - Pxl)(X/Y)l  +  (PM2 - PM1)(M/Y) 1
where the subscripts refer to averages over the first and second
subperiods, and country subscripts have been omitted.
The estimate of the shock variable turns out to be lower for
CFA countries than for any of the comparator groups.  Indeed, the
shock faced by other Sub-Saharan African countries was over twice
that facing CFA countries.  Hence, some of the lack of adjustment
in the CFA Zone may be explained by a reduced need for adjustment.
The question is whether, given the reduced need for adjustment,
the observed adjustment was still "too little".
The results7 are  presented in  Table 5.  The CFA dummy variable
has  a  negative  coefficient  for  all  comparisons.  The  two
coefficients that are consistently  significant  for the  CFA Zone are
those  in  the  inflation  and  current  account  equations.  The
interpretation  is  that  CFA  countries,  after  controlling  for
differences in the shocks they faced between the two periods, had
lower inflation and less current account improvement  in the 1980's
relative to the 1970's.  The coefficients on the dummy variables
for the GDP growth and investment equations are also lower,  but not
7After correction  for heteroskedasticity and  one  round of
exclusion tests for outliers.18
Table 5
Performance in the CFA Zone
Dependent
Variable,  Y_1 _1  CA  CFA  SH
Comparison with Other Sub-Saharan  African Countries:
Y  -.889*  .094  .021  .057  -.009  .049
(-4.73)  (1.47)  (.80)  (.54)  (-.82)  (1.01)
I/Y  1.032*  -.656*  .010  .061  -.022  .235
(2.37)  (-3.72)  (.09)  (.27)  (-.89)  (1.70)
INF  -2.151*  -.012  .212  -1.397*  -.138*  .135
(-2.47)  (-.05)  (.67)  (-4.24) (-3.01)  (.63)
CA  .282*  .052  .021  -.661*  -.032*  -.106*
(1.73)  (.85)  (.95)  (-5.84)  (-3.24) (-2.18)
Comparison with Other Low-Income Countries:
y  -,433*  .035  .039  -.093  -.021  .014
(-2.63)  (.58)  (1.27)  (-.95)  (-1.58)  (.37)
I/Y  .457*  -.36*  -.004  .185  -.01  -.078
(2.07)  (-3.74)  (-.06)  (1.54)  (-.77) (-1.28)
INF  -1.70*  -.276*  .163  -.827*  -.134*  .081
(-4.4)  (1.75)  (.65)  (-4.64)  (-3.85)  (1.17)
CA  .111  -.025  .015  -.765*  -.024*  -.056
(.76)  (-.48)  (.62)  (-6.87)  (-2.48) (-1.40)
Comparison with Primary Exporting Countries;
Y  -.63*  .069  .025  .01  -.015  .02
(-5.1)  (1.60)  (1.58)  (.16)  (-1.30)  (.66)
I/Y  .55*  -.391*  -.027*  -.091  -.005  -.116*
(2.77)  (-5.41) (-1.85)  (-.63)  (-.36)  (2.00)
INF  -.75*  -.003  -.123  -.537*  -.106*  .046
(-1.72)  (-.002) (-.59)  (-2.74)  (-2.58)  (.59)
CA  -.033  .032  -.001  -.781*  -.026*  -.068
(-.23)  (.58) (-.06)  (-7.01)  (-2.40)  (1.51)
Notes:  The  constant  term  is  omitted  from  the  results.  Asterisks  denote  those  coefficients  which  are
significant  at  least  at  the  90  percent  level.  Y  - GDP  growth-  IIY  - investment/GDP;  CA  a current
account/GDP;  INF  - inflation  rate.  The  subscript  (-1)  denotes  iagged  values.  Results  are  corrected
for  heteroskedasticity  by  weighing  each  observation  by  the  inverse  of  its  estimated  standard  error.
Extreme  influential  observations  are  excluded.19
significantly  so.  The  overall  impression  from  this  set  of
regression  coefficients  is that,  while  average  GDP  growth  and
investment-to-GDP ratios may have been lower in the 1980's in the
CFA Zone, the more significant differences appear in the average
inflation rates and current account improvement.  The former is
not surprising.  As mentioned earlier, the rules of Zone membership
prevent CFA governments from levying an inflation tax, so that the
fixed effect on inflation for CFA countries would be lower.  The
current account coefficient is much more troubling.  It implies
that in all of the comparator groups,  CFA countries are conspicuous
by their inability to reduce their current account deficits, even
taking into account the fact that the shocks they face (i.e.,  the
need to adjust) may have been different.
This observation is consistent with our earlier result about
the lack of real exch nge rate depreciation in the CFA Zone.  While
the rest of Sub-Sahar_n Africa depreciated its real exchange rate
by an average of 25 percent in the 1980's, the CFA  Zone's real
exchange rate appreciated.  Such a result would not have been a
problem by itself if the CFA countries did not need to depreciate
their real exchange rate.  However, the coefficients in Table 5
show that they needed to.  Controlling for differences in shocks
they faced, the amount of current account improvement in the CFA
Zone was systematically lower than in the comparator groups.
Note that the  coefficients  of the lagged  variables are usually
significant with the expected sign.  The higher the value of the
own-lagged variable, the lesser the change in performance between20
the two periods.  For example, other things equal, the higher is
average growth in  the period 1973-81, the less is the increase in
average growth during 1982-89 compared with 1973-81.  While the
external shock variable has the expected sign for  the inflation  and
current account equations, it enters  positively with the change in
growth  and investment, which  is unexpected.  Although,  in most
instances, these coefficients are not statistically significant,
the low explanatory power of the proxy measure for external shocks
suggests some measurement inaccuracies.
Another problem with the results in Table 5 is that we may
have misspecified the model.  In particular, by controlling  for
autonomous policy changes separately from CFA Zone membership, we
may  be  neglecting  those  aspects  of  Zone  membership  that  are
associated with policy.  An alternative formulation would be to
leave out the independent  variables for autonomous policy changes
or, their proxy, the lagged dependent variables.8  Unfortunately,
this specification only yielded significant coefficients for the
CFA  variable  in  the  inflation  equation.  The  effect  of  CFA
membership on current account improvement was not statistically
significant.  Thus, isolating autonomous policy changes sharpens
our estimates of the fixed  effec s due to Zone  membership, possibly
because there was no systematic relationship in the use of these
policies among Zone members.
Despite  these qualifications, there  is some evidence  that
adjustment in the CFA Zone has been insufficient in the 1980's,
8We are grateful to Stanley Fischer for this suggestion.21
arguably  the  era  when  almost  everybody  else  in  Africa  was
undertaking  major  adjustment  programs.  We  have  suggested one
reason for the Zone's lack of adjustment, namely, the inability of
Zone members to effect a  nominal devaluation.  But the nominal
exchange rate is but one instrument of adjustment.  In principle,
CFA Zone members have enough instruments  with which to adjust their
economies (Devarajan  and de Melo [1987b]).  In practice, they have
been reluctant to use these other instruments or, when they have
chosen  to use them, the results have been disappointing 9. The
advantage of a nominel  devaluation  is that it  permits "expenditure-
switching" to accompany the necessary "expenditure-reduction"  of
an adjustment program.  In this case, the amount of expenditure-
reduction required would  be less  (Corden [1988]).  It follows,
therefore,  that  CFA  members  would  have  had  to  rely  more  on
expenditure-reduction  as  opposed  to  expenditure-switching  in
reducing  their  current  account  deficits.  We  now  test  this
hypothesis.
Using the data from the two subperiods, 1973-81 and 1982-89,
we estimate an equation  which links the target  of adjustment --  the
resource  balance  expressed  as  a  ratio  to  GDP  --  with  the
investment rate and the real exchange rate.  The investment rate
is used here as an instrument for expenditure-changing policies.
Of  course,  there  are  other  instruments,  including  government
consumption expenditure.  However, it is easier to cut investment
9For a discussion of Cote d'Ivoire's atteml--  simulating a
devaluation by a uniform tariff-cum-subsidy sche,.  ee O'Connell
(1989].22
first, especially  in a slow growing economy.  Therefore,  it is
worth examining the extent to which improvements in the resource
balance reflected declines in investment.
The regression linking the resource balance with investment
and the real exchange rate also contains a dummy variable for each
country, to capture country-specific effects, and a time trend.
The  results of  the  regression  yield  a  negative  --  and  highly
significant --  coefficient on the investment variable for  both CFA
and non-CFA countries.  By contrast, the coefficient on the real
exchange rate variable is small and indistinguishable from zero.
This is consistent with other studies that have attempted to link
the  real  exchange  rate  to  the  resource  balance  or  the  trade
balance.  For  example,  Pritchett  (1990]  found  only  a  weak
relationship between the merchandise trade balance and the real
exchange rate, even when controlling for terms of trade movements.
His reasoning, which may also apply here, was that while exports
may  respond to changes in the real exchange rate, imports were
determined by  foreign exchange availability, i.e., exports, and
hence may move perversely.
Undaunted by the  insignificance of the  real exchange rate
variable, we use the estimated regression coefficients to compute
the predicted resource balance in 1978-79 and 1987-88.  For both
CFA and non-CFA countries, the resource balance improved between
the first and second two-year periods.  This is a reflection of
the cutback in foreign lending in the 1980's and the simultaneous
need for these countries to make increasingly higher debt-service23
payments.  We  can  then  ask  the  question:  how  much  of  the
improvement  in  the resource balance  between 1978-79  and 1987-88  was
due to investment-reduction, and how much to real-exchange-rate
depreciation?  Were the relative proportions  different between CFA
and non-CFA countries?  The results are reported in Table 6.
Table 6
Changes in Resource Balance, Investment and
the Real Exchange Rate between 1978/9 and '987/8
Average Predicted Change in  Investment  RER
Resource Balance/GDP  Component  Component
CFA  .046-  .071  -.033
Other Low
Income  .050-  .053  .232
Note:  Column 1 is equal to the sum of columns 2 and 3 plus
the intercept term.
First, although the improvement in the resource balance-to-
GDP ratio was roughly comparable for the two groups of countries,
the  investment  components  were  quite  different.  CFA  countries
relied  more  heavily on  cutting  investment than  did  other  low-
income countries.  Second, the real exchange rate component even
has  the  wrong  sign  for  CFA  countries.  That  is,  instead  of
contributing to the reduction in the current account deficit, the
real exchange rate may have worked against it in the CFA Zone,
though the lack of statistical significance of the coefficient on
the real exchange rate variable calls for caution in interpreting
this  result.  Finally,  and  most  importantly,  the  relative24
contributions  of  investment-reduction  and  real  exchange  rate
depreciation  are  very  different  between  the  two  groups  of
countries.  For  other  low-income countries,  it  is  about  one-
quarter whereas for CFA members it is over 2  (and with the wrong
sign).
V. Conclusions
The purpose of this paper  has been  to assess whether  the
particular institutional arrangement of the CFA Zone has aided or
hurt its  members.  It  has been argued  that the convertible currency
with  a  fixed  exchange  rate  results  in  monetary  and  fiscal
discipline which, in turn, benefits Zone members.  Just as Ulysses
tied himself to the mast, CFA governments abdicated the right to
levy an inflation tax so that they will never be tempted to do so.
The  evidence  of  the  relative  performance  of  CFA  countries'
economies vis-a-vis their comparators  shows that this argument was
persuasive until the early 1980's.
After 1981, changes in the world environment and persistent
current account deficits  meant that CFA countries needed to adjust
their economies along with most other developing countries.  Our
statistical results show that they did not adjust as much as they
needed  to.  Furthermore,  their  growth  performance  was
disappointing.  Under  every estimate, Zone members'  GDP growth
rates fell  behind those of their counterparts, including the other
African states.  Finally, the burden of adjustment appears to have
fallen  disproportionately on expenditure-reduction  in general, and25
investment-reduction in particular --  an ominous sign for future
growth.
Of  course,  a  change  in  external  circumstances  does  not
necessarily mean that the original comaitment to a fixed exchange
rate was unwise.10 It is possible that CFA Zone members took all
these contingencies into account in making the original decision
to join the Zone and hence forego  the opportunity to devalue their
nominal exchange rate in the future.  In this case, there are no
policy implications from the recent deterioration in the Zone's
economic performance.  The members may have drawn a bad hand, but
not one which renders their original decision sub-optimal.
An  alternative  interpretation  is  that  the  current
circumstances facing the CFA Zone lie outside the set of events
which were considered when the original decision to join the zone
was made.  In particular, the adverse terms of trade shocks of the
1970s and 1980s, and the attendant need to shift resources from
nuntradables  to tradables,  may not have been expected in the 1960s.
Such an argument is compelling because the exchange rate is both
an  instrument  for  transforming  resources  from  nontradables  to
tradables as well as an inflation-creating (or controlling) tool.
It  could be that the founders  of the Zone calculated the inflation-
controlling benefits of a fixed exchange rate without anticipating
the  costs  in  terms  of  the  countries'  inability  to  adjust  to
unfavorable external circumstances.  Thus, the very institutional
l°We are grateful to Ravi Kanbur, whose comments helped us
sharpen this argument.26
arrangement  which  enabled  these  countrtes  to  enjoy  faster  and  more
stable  growth  in the 1970's  is preventing  them from  adjusting  to
the external  and internal  shocks  of the 1980's.  In short,  what
began  as an Odyssean  journey  may have  turned  into  a  Trojan  horse.27
References
Corden, W. M., "Macroeconomic  Adjustment in Developing Countries,"
Research Department, International Monetary Fund, 1988.
Devarajan, S. and J. de Melo, "Evaluating  Participation in  African
Monetary Unions: A Statistical Analysis of the CFA Zones,"
World Development, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 483-96, 1987a.
Devarajan, S. and J. de Melo,  "Adjustment  with a Fixed Exchange
Rate:  Cameroon,  Cote  d'Ivoire  and  Senegal,,  World  Bank
Economic Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1987b.
Faini, R., J. de Melo, A. Senhadji-Semlali  and J. Stanton, "Growth-
Oriented Adjustment Programs:  A Statistical  Analysis",  World
Development (forthcoming).
Faini, R. and J. de Melo,  "Adjustment, Investment and the Real
Exchange  Rate  in  Developing  Countries,"  Economic  Policy
(forthcoming).
Fuller,  W.  and  G.  Battese,  "Estimation of  Linear  Models  with
Crossed  Error Structure,"  Journal  of  Econometrics,  Vol. 2,  pp.
67-78, 1974.
Guillaumont, P. and S.  Zone Franc et Developpement  Africain, Paris:
Economica, 1984.
Guillaumont, P., S. Guillaumont and P. Plane,  "Participating in
African Monetary Unions: An Alternative Evaluation," World
Development, Vol. 16, No. 5, pp. 569-76, 1988a.
Guillaumont,  P.  and  S.  Guillaumont,  eds.,  Strategies  de
DevelopPement  Comparees: Zone  Franc et Hors Zone Franc,  Paris:
Economica, 1986b.
Honohan,  P.  "Monetary  Cooperation  in  the  CFA  Zone,"  Policy,
Research and External  Affairs  Working Paper  No. WPS 389,  World
Bank, 1990.
O'Connell,  S.  "Uniform Trade  Taxes,  Devaluation  and  the  Real
Exchange Rate: A Theoretical Analysis," Policy Planning and
Research Working Paper No. WPS 185,  World Bank, 1989.
Pritchett, L., "The  Merchandise  Trade Balance and the Real Exchange
Rate  in LDC's," Country Economics Department, World  Bank,
1990.
Rodrik,  D.,  "The Welfare  Economics of  Debt  Service,"  John  F.
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1989.28
World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth,
Washington,  D.C.,  1989.PRE  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Author  for pager
WPS455 A Formal  Estimation  of the Effect  Junichi  Goto  June 1990  M. T. Sanchez
of the MFA  on Clothing  Exports  33731
from LDCs
WPS456  Improving  the Supply  and  Use  of  S. D. Foster  June 1990  Z. Vania
,Essential Drugs  in Sub-Saharan  Africa  33664
WPS457  Financing  Health  Services  in Africa:  Germano  Mwabu  June 1990  Z. Vania
An Assessment  of Alternative  33664
Approaches
WPS458  Does  Japanese  Direct  Foreign  Kenji  Takeuchi  June 1990  J. Epps
Investment  Promote  Japanese  Imports  33710
from Developing  Countries?
WPS459  Policies  for Economic  Development  Stanley  Fischer  June 1990  WDR  Office
Vinod  Thomas  31393
WPS460  Does  Food  Aid  Depress  Food  Victor Lavy  July 1990  A. Murphy
Production?  The  Disincentive  33750
Dilemma  in the African  Context
WPS461  Labor  Market  Participation,  Returns  Shahidur  R. Khandker  July 1990  B.  Smith
to Education,  and  Male-Female  35108
Wage  Differences  in Peru
WPS462 An  Alternative  View  of Tax  Anwar  Shah  July 1990  A. Bhalla
Incidence  Analysis  for Developing  John  Whalley  37699
Countries
WPS463 Redefining  Government's  Role  in  Odin  Knudsen  August  1990  K.  Cabana
Agriculture  in  the Nineties  John  Nash  37946
WPS464 Does  A Woman's  Education  Affect  Shoshana  Neuman  August  1990  V. Charles
Her Husband's  Earnings?  Results  Adrian  Ziderman  33651
for Israel  in A Dual  Labor  Market
WPS465 How Integrated  Are  Tropical  Timber  Panos  Varangis  August  1990  D. Gustafson
Markets?  33714
WPS466 Is There  An Intra-Household  Lawrence  Haddad  August  1990  J. Sweeney
Kuznets  Curve?  Ravi  Kanbur  31021
WPS467  Structural  Adjustment  and Living  Nanak  Kakwani  August 1990  B. Rosa
Conditions  in Developing  Countries  Elene  Makonnen  33751
Jacques  van der  Gaag
WPS468  Does  the Structure  of Production  Indermit  Gill  August  1990  M.  Abundo
Affect  Demand  for Schooling  in Peru?  36820PRE  Worklng  Paper  Series
Contact
ilia  Autbh  for papfLr
WPS469  Modeling  Economic  Behavior  in  J. Barry  Smith  August 1990  M. Abundo
Peru's  Informal  Urban  Retail  Sector  Morton  Stelcner  36820
WPS470 What  Do Alternative  Measures  of  Alexander  J. Yeats  August  1990  J. Epps
Comparative  Advantage  Reveal  33710
About  the Composition  of Developing
Countries'  Exports?
WPS471  The  Determinants  of  Farm  Gershon  Feder  August  1990  C. Spooner
Investment  and Residential  Lawrence  J. Lau  30464
Construction  in Post-Reform  China  Justin Lin
Xiaopeng  Luo
WPS472 Gains in  the Education  of Peruvian  Elizabeth  M. King  August 1990  C. Cristobal
Women,  1940  to 1980  Rosemary  Bellew  33640
WPS473 Adjustment,  Investment,  and  the  Riccardo  Faini  August  1990  R. Sugui
Real  Exchange  Rate  in Developing  Jaime  de Melo  37951
Countries
WPS474  Methods  for Measuring  the Effect  Anne  Maasland  August  1990  P. Dixon
of Adjustment  Policies  on Income  39175
Distribution
WPS475 Does  Divestiture  Matter? A  Ahmed  Galal  August  1990  G. Orraca-Tetteh
Framework  for Learning  from  Experience  37646
WPS476  Health  Insurance  in Sub-Saharan  Ronald  J. Vogel  August  1990  K. Brown
Africa: A Survey  and Analysis  35073
WPS477  Private  Participation  in the Delivery  Thelma  A.  Triche  August 1990  M. Dhokai
of Guinea's  Water  Supply  Services  33970
WPS478  Interrelations  Among  Child  Mortality, John Marcotte  August  1990  S. Cochrane
Breasffeeding,  and Fertility  in  John  B. Casterline  33222
Egypt,  1975-80
WPS479 Conversion  Factors: A Discussion  Michael  Hee  August1990  E.  Zamora
of Alternate  Rates  and  Corresponding  33706
Weights
WPS480  An Evaluation  of Neutral  Trade  Policy Jaime  de Melo  August 1990  R. Sugui
Incentives  Under  Increasing  Returns  David  Roland-Hoist  37951
to Scale
WPS481  The  Effects  of Trade  Reforms  on  James  Tybout  August 1990  R. Sugui
Scale and  Technical  Efficiency:  Jaime  de Mslo  37951
New  Evidence  from Chile  Vittorio  Corbo
WPS482  Membership  in the  CFA  Zone:  Shantayanan  Devarajan  August 1990  R. Sugui
Odyssean  Journey  or Trojan  Horse?  Jaime  de Melo  37951